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Since the earliest times, individuals and groups of individuals have been interested  
in communicating sensitive information in a manner which would guarantee that such  
information could not be arbitrarily received. Further, such information was to be received  
by select recipients and this required that a means of secure information transmission be  
found and employed. To these ends, methods of information encryption have ever since been  
sought and employed.  The entire study and practice of this activity, cryptology, the science  
of message encryption and decryption, provides a framework for this thesis.  In particular,  
the development of cryptology has been influenced by some specific areas of mathematics,  
employing abstract mathematical concepts and utilizing algebraic structures known as elliptic  
curves. It is with respect to these structures and their utilization in specific cryptosystems,  
called elliptic curve cryptosystems on which this thesis focuses. More specifically, this  
thesis is concerned with the implementation of such a cryptosystem and is a demonstration 
of that implementation.  Additional pertinent examples, illustrations and supporting  
computer programs are included to present a self-contained work. 
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CRYPTOGRAPHY- CLASSICAL AND MODERN 
 
BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS 
In order to introduce the topic at hand, a few basic definitions are in order.  The 
following is a list of components common to any cryptosystem and their definitions. 
 
Plaintext: message to be sent 
Plaintexts are broken up into message units 
Ciphertext: message disguised by some method of encryption 
Encryption: process of converting plaintext to ciphertext 
Decryption: process of converting ciphertext back to plaintext 
Enciphering transformation: a function taking any plaintext message unit and mapping it 
to a ciphertext message unit in 1-1 correspondence. 
Deciphering transformation: an inverse function of the enciphering transformation. 
Hence, the following mapping: 
f  f-1 
P  C  P 
Cryptosystem: a messaging system with the above components 
CLASSICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY 
An early example of a cryptosystem is one apparently  used by Julius Caesar as 
follows.  Using an N letter alphabet and some integer b, assign a shift transformation 
given by C = f(P) ≡ P + b mod N where C is a ciphertext message unit in {0, 1, ..., N - 1}. 
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Decipher by C - b mod N to give the inverse.  This system used a fixed set of values for 
ciphertexts, but eventually these were varied to add security.  Decryption depends on 
frequency analysis to find b. We find the most frequently occurring ciphertext unit to 
assign it to the most frequently used letter in the plaintext language. Decryption can be 
accomplished by intercepting relatively short messages. 
A slight improvement came with affine maps using a more general transformation 
of Z/NZ defined by C ≡ aP + b mod N where a,b are fixed integers and (a,N) = 1.  
Decryption is given by solving for P in terms of C using P ≡ a′C + b′mod N where a′ = a-1 
in Z/NZ and b′ = -a-1b.  If a = 1 we obtain the shift transformation above, and if b = 0 we 
have a linear transformation. We can solve the resulting system of congruent equations 
once we have done a frequency analysis as above to obtain two letters (most and second 
most frequently used letters). 
Another approach, still better, involves using digraph transformations. Plaintext 
and ciphertext message units come in two letter blocks called digraphs. If the plaintext 
message has an odd number of letters we add one more that will not cause confusion, say 
a blank or some other dummy.  Assign numerical equivalents to each digraph, say xN + y 
for example where x,y are numerically equivalent to the first and second letter in the 
digraph respectively. This gives a 1-1 correspondence between digraphs in the N letter 
alphabet and nonnegative integers less than N2.  Use an affine transformation over the 
integers modulo Z/N  2.  The inversion process is as given above.  Define the encrypted P 
to be the nonnegative integer less than N2 satisfying the congruence C ≡ aP + b mod N2. 
Then the inverse transformation is comparable to the above modulo N2. 
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Continuing further, we can consider each digraph instead as a column vector in x 
and y say.  Picture each digraph as a point on an N x N array with each axis as a copy of 
Z/NZ.  This was the idea of the Vigenere cipher used for several centuries.  The idea was 
to treat blocks of k letters (k, fixed) as vectors in (Z/NZ)k.  Some fixed vector b  
remembered as a key-word allowed one to encipher by vector translation C = P + b. This 
is of course almost as easy to solve as the first method. 
An improvement over this method uses affine enciphering transformations on a 
digraph column vector (2X1) called P.  Take a 2X2 matrix A over Z/NZ and adding a 
constant column vector (2X1) called B we have C = AP + B as the affine mapping. 
Thus 
x′   a   b x e ax + by + e 
      =          = 
y′  c   d y f cx + dy +  f 
All the above methods share three properties. First, each cryptosystem corresponds 
to a choice of parameters whose values are necessary for encryption, known as an 
encryption key, and also a set of values known as a decryption key.  Second, it is not 
really necessary to know the decryption key given the encryption key since the effort to 
determine the latter from the former is a relatively simple process given that the former is 
already known, with its appropriate algorithm. Finally, the amount of time for encryption 
and decryption share the same order of magnitude with respect to computation time. It is 
the elimination of part or all of these features that distinguishes modern cryptography 
from classical. 
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MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Public Key Cryptography 
A public key cryptosystem (1976, Diffie & Hellman) differs from the above 
methods in that knowledge of the encryption key does not guarantee with any reasonable 
probability that one can also determine the decryption key as well without prohibitively 
long computations. Thus, the encryption function (called a trapdoor function) is easily 
computable while its inverse is from a computation standpoint, very difficult to compute.  
The function f is then said to be non-invertible, without additional information besides the 
encryption algorithm and key. 
One way functions (Wilkes, 1968) are similar except that even given the 
additional information, computational ease is not achieved. Computation times for the 
two processes vary radically with decryption being the more difficult of the two.  Using 
the idea of trapdoor and one-way functions, Rivest, Shamir & Adelman (1974) developed 
the concept of a public key cryptosystem (RSA method) based on factoring a large 
composite integer into primes factors.  
RSA method: Each user chooses two extremely large primes, p,q of about 100 
digits each, say. Set n = pq.  Knowing how to factor n, it is easy to compute _(n) = (p - 
1)(q - 1) = n + 1 - p - q.  The user next chooses an integer x between 1 and _(n) such that 
(x,_(n)) =1.  Note that we randomly choose x,p, and q as follows. Using a random number 
generator, generate a large integer m and check if m is even.  If so, replace by m + 1 and 
test for primality.  If it is not prime increment by 2 and check again. Continue until a 
prime is reached.  The user computes also the multiplicative inverse of x modulo _(n), call 
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it d. The public enciphering key (n,x) is made known while the decryption key (n,d) is 
kept secret.  The enciphering transformation is given by f(P) ≡ Px mod n.  The deciphering 
transformation is given by f-1(C) ≡ Cd mod n, since these maps are inverses of each other 
by the choice of d. 
Discrete Log Method 
Another more modern method using the trapdoor idea involves using discrete logarithms 
over finite fields.  Given a finite group, say Z/NZ or a finite field with multiplication, and 
an element y = bx , how do we compute x = logby? Discrete log cryptosystems based on 
the multiplicative group of a finite field have been shown as vulnerable to various index-
calculus attacks[11, p. 418].  Hence these are not particularly secure given the present 
state of knowledge.  
Elliptic Curves 
By 1987, elliptic curves were being implemented in cryptosystems. An 
improvement over the discrete log method does not directly use the finite fields or groups 
but rather the elliptic curves defined over them[5],[11].  Elliptic curves have group 
structure that allows the encryption of message units to be implemented utilizing simple 
rational expressions.  A correspondence with the location of points on these curves is 
established with the plaintext units after appropriate imbedding.  Elliptic curves are 
known to provide a high degree of security and great variety for 
implementation[1],[5],[11].  
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ELLIPTIC CURVES 
DEFINITION, NORMAL FORMS AND ADDITION FORMULAS 
A Weierstrass equation defined over a field K is a degree 3 homogeneous equation 
given by  
Y2Z + a1XYZ + a3YZ2 = X3 +a2X2Z + a4XZ2 + a6Z3  
where the ai ∈ K, i =1,2,3,4,6.  The equation is called smooth or non-singular if for all 
projective points P = (X,Y,Z) ∈ P2(K), K an algebraic closure of K, satisfying 
F(X,Y,Z) =  Y2Z + a1XYZ + a3YZ2 - X3 +a2X2Z + a4XZ2 + a6Z3  =  0 
we have  
(∂F/∂X(P),∂F/∂Y(P),∂F/∂Z(P)) ≠ (0,0,0). 
 An elliptic curve, then, is the set of all solutions  in P2(K) of a smooth Weierstrass 
equation defined over K. Using non-homogeneous coordinates x = X/Z, y = Y/Z, the 
Weierstrass equation becomes 
E: y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6      ai ∈ K, i = 1,2,3,4,6. 
By a linear change of variables, the Weierstrass equation for an elliptic curve reduces to 
what is called the normal form, of which a table has been prepared on page 11. The points 
(x, y) ∈  K x K that are solutions of the equation, together with a point at infinity, can 
have a group structure imposed on them if addition and an identity element are defined as 
below.  That the requisite properties of an abelian group are satisfied has been verified 
[12]. To be able to add and double points in the curve group, necessary for any encryption 
procedure, one uses simple formulas derived directly from the equation of the particular 
curve.  For the general case we have the following results[12]. 
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First, let E be given by a Weierstrass equation as above. The group elements of E 
then consists of points P = (x,y) satisfying the equation together with an identity element 
identified with the point (0,1,0) at infinity.  In projective space, a line L that intersects E 
in the space intersects it in three points counting multiplicity.  Where two of these points 
are distinct in the y coordinates only, the third point of intersection is (0,1,0) at infinity 
and identified as the identity of the curve group which we will label O. 
Let P1 = (x1,y1) and P2 = (x2,y2). Then we define 
P1 ⊕ P2  =  P3 = (x3,y3) where x3 and y3 are obtained via the equations below. 
The symbol ⊕ is used here to indicate addition of points in the curve group.  Henceforth, 
group addition of points will simply be indicated by +. 
Notice first that if x1 = x2, then either y1 = y2 or y1 + y2 + a1x2 + a3 = 0 [12]. 
In order to add two points  P1 = (x 1, y 1) and P 2 = (x  2 , y  2) , we consider the following 
exhaustive list of cases. 
Case 1.  If x1 = x2 and y1 + y2 + a1x2 + a3 = 0 then P1 + P2 = O (the identity). 
 
 
 
Otherwise, that is, if y1 + y2 + a1x2 + a3 ≠ 0, we have two more cases: 
 
 
Case 2.  If x1 ≠ x2, set 
 
λ =  y2 - y1    v = y1x2 - x1y2 
 x2 - x1            x2 - x1 
 
 
then a new point  P3 = (x3,y3) is obtained by  
 
x3 =  λ2 + a1λ - a2 - x1 - x2   y3 =  -(λ + a1)x3 - v - a3. 
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Case 3. If  x1 = x2 and y1 = y2, set 
 
 
λ = 3x12 + 2a2x1 + a4 - a1y1 v = -x13 + a4x1 + 2a6 - a3y1   
     2y1 + a1x1 + a3         2y1 + a1x1 + a3 
 
 
Then a new point P3 = (x3,y3) is obtained by 
 
x3 =  λ2 + a1λ - a2 - x1 - x2  y3 =  -(λ + a1)x3 - v - a3 
 
 
 
Note that v = yi - λxi, for i = 1,2 in cases 2 and 3.  Furthermore, note that if P = (x0, y0) ∈ 
E, 
 
then the additive inverse of P, -P = (x0, - y0 - a1x0 - a3). 
 
 
[Geometrically, we are taking the line joining P1 and  P2 (or the tangent line if P1 =  P2),  
picking the third intersection point ~P3 and defining P3 to be the intersection point of the 
line through O and ~P3 with the curve. (Note ~P = -P as defined).] 
 
If in any computation, we find that the denominator vanishes, then the resulting point is 
taken to be point at infinity, namely O, the identity.  An alternate set of expressions for 
Case 3 to compute the doubling of a point are given as follows. 
 
The x coordinate of 2P ≠ O, namely x2P, is given by  
 
            x4 - b4x2 - 2b6x - b8     , if P = (x,y). 
          4x3 + b2x2 + 2b4x + b6 
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The y coordinate of 2P, namely y2P, is given by 
 
-x2P [3x2+2a2x+a4+a1y+a12x+a3a1]+x3-a4x-2a6-a3y-a1a3x-a32 
2y+a1x+a3 
 
 
where bi is defined in terms of the coefficients ai of the curve equation: 
b2 = a12 + 4a2   b4 = a1a3 + 2a4  b6 = a32 + 4a6 
b8 = a 12a 6 - a 1a 3a 4 + 4 a 2a 6 + a 2 a 32 - a 42 
We also define for purposes of computation the following quantities. 
(Discriminant)  ∆ = -b 22 b 8 - 8 b 43 - 27b62 + 9b2 b4 b6 
c4 = b22 - 24b4   j-invariant j(E) = c43/∆ 
The quantities  ∆ and j(E) are used in classifying elliptic curves in the following. 
Definitions: 
A curve E satisfying ∆ = 0 is said to be  singular. 
If  ∆≠ 0, then: 
A curve E whose j-invariant j(E) = 0 is called a supersingular curve. 
A curve E whose j-invariant j(E) ≠ 0 is called a non-supersingular curve. 
 
In cryptology, any elliptic curve satisfying j(E) = 0 has been shown to be vulnerable to 
certain methods of attack [10],[11]. Such curves are a relative minority of all elliptic 
curves.  For each class of curve with its respective j-invariant and discriminant ∆ see 
Table T1.  In particular settings we then have various forms of the above equations 
and formulas reduced below as follows. 
The remainder of this section concludes with general formulas for point doubling 
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and addition in arbitrary curves over fields of characteristic p, prime≠ 2,3, characteristic 2 
and characteristic 3. In subsequent sections, the particular forms for some specific 
examples of  curves over finite fields of characteristic p≠ 2,3, characteristic 2 and 
characteristic 3 will be given.  We will look at some features of the following curves: 
 
1) y2 = x3 - 36x defined over the rationals 
2) y2 = x3 + x + 1 defined over F5 
3) y2 + y = x3 + x + 1, a supersingular curve defined over F8 
4) y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + 1, a non-supersingular curve defined over F8 
5) y2 = x3 + 2x2 + 1, a non-supersingular curve defined over F27. 
Included in the appendix is an implementation of the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + x + 1 
defined over Fp, where p = 383 + 356. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14
Table 1. Table of Normal Forms with Discriminant and j-invariant 
 
Characteristic ≠ 2,3 
y2 = x3 + a4x + a6  ∆ = -16(4a43 + 27a62)  j = 1728        4a43             
    4a43 + 27a62 
 
 
Characteristic 3  and  j(E) ≠ 0  (Non-supersingular) 
y2 = x3 + a2x2 + a6  ∆ = -a23a6   j = -a23/a6 
 
Characteristic 3 and  j(E) = 0 (Supersingular) 
y2 =  x3 + a4x + a6  ∆ = -a43   j = 0 
 
Characteristic 2 and  j(E) ≠ 0 (Non-supersingular) 
y2 + xy = x3 + a2x2 + a6 ∆ = a6     j = 1/a6 
 
 
Characteristic 2 and  j(E) = 0 (Supersingular) 
y2 + a3y = x3 + a4x + a6 ∆ = a34   j = 0 
We first consider curves over a field of characteristic p ≠ 2,3.  The Weierstrass 
normal form then becomes  
 y2 = x3 + a4x + a6 
Setting a1 = a2 = a3 = 0 we have the following addition formulas for distinct points.  
Let P1 = (x1,y1) and P2 = (x2,y2), and P1 + P2 ≠ O:   ( x1 ≠ x2 ) 
For 
    λ = y2 - y1 
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            x2 - x1  
and 
      
 v =  y1x2 - x1y2  
         x2 - x1 
we have 
 
 x3 = λ2 - x1 - x2 
y3 = -λx3 - v. 
Doubling formula for yielding x2P where P = (x,y) is given by  
(x4 - 2a4x2 - 8a6x + a42)[4(x3 + a4x + a6)]-1 and 
y2P =[-x2P(3x2 + a4) + x3 -a4x - 2a6](2y)-1 
All such curves are non-supersingular if a4 ≠ 0. 
 
If a characteristic 2 non-supersingular curve has the form 
y2 + xy = x3 + a2x2 + a6.  
then x3 = λ2 + λ + a2 + x1 + x2 
y3 = (λ + 1)x3 + v 
with λ and v as before where  
P1 = (x1,y1) and P2 = (x2,y2) are distinct points, P1 + P2 ≠ O.   
The doubling formula yielding x2P is given by  
(x4 - a6)(x2)-1 and 
y2P =[-x2P(x2 + x + y) + x3](x-1). 
If a  characteristic 2 supersingular curve has form  
y2 + a3y  = x3 + a4x + a6 
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then x3 = λ2 + x1 + x2  
y3 = λx3 + v + a3 
with λ and v as above. 
Doubling formula for x2P is given by 
 x3 = (x4 + a42)(a32)-1 and 
y2P = [-x2P(x2 + a4) + x(x2 - a4) + a3(y + a3)] (a3)-1 
 
 
As an alternate form of the formulas for addition and doubling points of characteristic 2 
non-supersingular and supersingular curves respectively we have the following[9].  
 
Non-Supersingular Curves      (j Invariant ≠ 0) 
 
 
Addition Formulas      P1 ≠ P2, P1 + P2 ≠ O 
 
x3 = (y1 + y2)2(x1 + x2)-2 + (y1 + y2)(x1 + x2)-1 + x1 + x2 + a2 
 
y3 =  (y1 + y2)(x1 + x2)-1(x1 + x3) + y1 + x3 
 
 
 
 
Doubling Formulas      P = (x,y), 2P ≠ O 
   
 
x2P =  x2 + a6x-2 
 
y2P = x2 + (x + yx-1) x2P + x2P 
 
Supersingular        (j Invariant = 0) 
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Addition Formulas       
 
x3 = (y1 + y2)2(x1 + x2)-2 + x1 + x2 
 
y3 =  (y1 + y2)(x1 + x2)-1(x1 + x3) + y1 + a3 
 
 
 
 
Doubling Formulas       
 
x2P =  (x4 + a42)(a3-2) 
 
y2P = (x2 + a4)(a3-1)(x + x2P) + y + a3 
 
 
Characteristic 3 Non-supersingular curves take the form 
 y2 = x3 + a2x2 + a6 
 We have the following addition formulas given by 
x3 = λ2 - a2 - x1- x2 
y3 = - λx3 - v 
 λ and v as defined previously. 
Doubling formula to obtain x2P is given by 
 (x4 + a6x - a2a6)(x3 + a2x2 + a6)-1 and 
y2P =[-x2P(2a2x) + x3 + a6](-y)-1. 
Finally, we have the characteristic 3 supersingular curves with form 
y2 = x3 + a4x + a6  
where a1 = a2 = a3 = 0.  The addition formulas then are given by 
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x3 = λ2 - x1 - x2 
 y3 = -λx3 - v 
where λ and v are as before with the doubling formula for x2P given by 
 (x4 + a4x2 + a6x + a42)(x3 + a4x + a6)-1 and 
y2P =[-x2P(a4) + x3  - a4x + a6](-y)-1. 
 
THE ELLIPTIC CURVE y2 = x3 - 36x OVER Q 
For this particular curve, y2 = f(x) = x3 - 36x over Q we have the following 
formulas: 
Addition: P1 ≠ P2, x1 ≠ x2     
x3 = - x1 - x2 + ((y2 -y1)/(x2-x1))2   
λ = (y2-y1)/(x2-x1) 
Doubling:  P1 = P2, y1 ≠ 0     
x3 = -2x1 + (f′(x1)/2y1)2 
λ = f′(x1)/2y1 
In both cases y3 = -y1 + λ(x1 - x3). 
We clearly have the points (0,0), (6,0) and (-6,0) on the curve for starters and note that (-
3,9) is also on the curve.  We can generate some additional points and see also how these 
fit into the curve group.  Using any two(distinct) of the above given three points will 
generate the other using the addition formula.  So suppose we wish to add the points  
P1:(-3,9) and P2:(0,0).   Then  
x3 = -(-3) - (0) + [-9/3]2 = 12.  
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The slope λ is given as -1.  We have 
 y3 = -9 + (-3)(-3-12) = 36.  
Thus (x3,y3) = (12,36) =  P1 +  P2.  
 
 
Next, let us illustrate the use of the doubling formula with the point P1 =  (-3,9).   
After appropriate substitutions we obtain 
  x3 = 6 + (-1/2)2 =  25/4          λ =   -9/18    = -1/2  
Thus we have  
2P1 =  2(-3,9)   =   (25/4, -35/8)   (See Fig. F1.) 
 
Note that there is no selection criterion for picking an intitial point.  One can pick 
an arbitrary point (x,y) ∈ Q2 whose coordinates satisfy the equation.  Then, quite 
mechanically, we can derive multiples of a single point by doubling repeatedly.  Thus one 
may obtain 2P, 4P, 8P, and so on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
Figure 1. Graph of the Elliptic Curve y2 = x3 - 36x defined over R 
 
AN ELLIPTIC CURVE OVER F5: y2 = x3 + x + 1 
Since we are working in F5, we are interested in the 5 possibilities for the values 
of  x in x3 + x + 1.  We check to see which ones are squares in F5.  We compute the 
number of points on an elliptic curve over a finite field Fp   by  
#E(Fp)   =   1   +   Σx mod p  (( x3 + x + 1)/p) + 1) 
where (a/p) denotes the Legendre symbol[5].  Thus one can exhaustively count the points 
by this computation for curves defined over small fields.  Computationally this is fine for 
prime fields of say up to about 105 to 107elements.  This writer had no problem using 
Mathematica for curves over fields of this size. For example, #E(F100043) = 99804. 
By a simple computation we get the following list:  
(0,1)   (0,4)  (2,1)  (2,4)  (3,1) 
  (3,4)  (4,2)  (4,3)  Ο, the identity 
Next, we write down the particular formulas for point addition and duplication. 
This particular step bears more weight in dealing with larger curve groups in that one 
does not generally obtain many points with which to work.  However, if one can obtain a 
few points and determine their order, one is able to get some idea rather quickly of the 
underlying group structure.  The formulas then serve in computing large orders for a 
given point.  Of course, the larger the curve group, the less likely one is to obtain the 
order for a given point since a large number of duplications may be required to take a 
point to the identity.  In this example the rational expressions have the following 
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formulas. 
λ = y2 - y1  if x1 ≠ x2 , 
x2 - x1  
(3x12 + 1)/2y1  if P1 = P2, y1 ≠ 0 
Finally, one computes the new coordinates for the added/doubled point to be  
x3 = λ2 - x1 - x2  
where the xi are non-distinct in the latter case.  Then  
y3 = -λ(x3 - x1) - y1 
In addition to these formulas there is a convenient duplication formula for doubling 
points without recomputing the x values each time.  Referring back to the first section in 
this thesis, the coefficients of our given curve can be checked and the ai identified.  Then 
the doubling formula for elliptic curves of characteristic p≠ 2 for this example becomes 
x2P = (x4 - 2x2 - 3x + 1)(4x3 + 4x + 4)-1  
where the appropriate reductions mod p have been made for this field.  After some 
computing, if P = (0,1), one obtains the points 2P = (4,2), 3P = (2,1) and 4P = (3,4) and 
so on(see Table T2). Note that this group is isomorphic to Z9. Table T3, obtained in 
similar manner by direct computation, gives a listing of some curves defined over various 
small finite fields. Included are group order and discriminant for each curve. 
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Table 2. Addition Table for Elements in the  
Elliptic Curve Group of y2 = x3 + x + 1 over F5 
 
 
 
 
Point   Order  Coordinate Pair   
 
    P           9    (0,1)  
   
  2P           9    (4,2)  
   
  3P           3    (2,1)  
   
  4P           9    (3,4)  
   
  5P           9    (3,1)  
   
  6P           3    (2.4)  
   
  7P           9    (4,3)  
   
 8P           9    (0,4)  
   
 9P           3         O  
   
 
 
 
Table 3. Table of Elliptic Curves over Various Small Fields 
 
Curve p: Field Fp  Discriminant ∆     ∆(mod p)    Group Order 
     
x3+x+1       3        -1       2  4 
      5   -24*31      4  9 
x3+x+2       3        -1       2  4 
      5      -28*7      3  4 
x3+x+3       5           -24*13*19      3  4 
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      7         ″       3  6 
x3+x+4       5  -26*109      4  9 
      7         ″      3          10 
x3+2x+1       3                  -2      1  7 
      5    -24*59     1  7 
x3+2x+2       3         -2     1  1 
     11    -26*5*7     4  9 
x3+2x+3       7           -2 4*52*11     3  6 
     13         ″      7          18 
x3+2x+4       5     -28*29      1  7 
      7         ″       3          10 
x3+3x+1       7    -24*33*5      3          12 
     11         ″      7          18 
x3+3x+2       5      -27*33       4   5 
      7         ″       2   9 
x3+3x+3       5           -24*33*13      4  5  
       7         ″       5            6 
x3+3x+4       7            -26*33*5      5          10 
     11         ″       6             14 
     13         ″        5          14 
x3+4x+1       5     -24*283      2  8 
      7         ″        1  5 
x3+4x+2       5     -26*7*13      1  3 
     11         ″       6  6 
x3+4x+3       5               -24*499      1  3 
      7         ″       3  6 
x3+4x+4       5       -28*43      2  8 
      7          ″      3             10  
 
A CHARACTERISTIC 2 SUPERSINGULAR CURVE: y2 + y = x3 + x + 1 over F8 
We continue with the first of two examples of curves defined over extensions of 
F2.   In this section we will be working with the model, F8 ≅ Z2[x]/ (x3 + x + 1) and in the 
next section with F8 ≅ Z2[x]/ (x3 + x2 + 1). Table T4 gives the two multiplication tables 
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for F8* for these two models.  Considering first 
E1: y2 + y = x3 + x + 1   
We collect all (x,y) ∈ F8* x F8* that satisfy the equation plus any having 0 as a coordinate 
and including the identity of the group  (O, the point at infinity). In this curve we should 
have  q + 1 + (2q)1/2 points in the curve group, where q is the order of the field(of 
characteristic 2, q = 2m, m odd)[9].  Since we do indeed have all 13 points we conclude 
that the curve group has order 13(see Table T5).  Also (u, 1) is found to be the generator 
for this group. 
In order to be able to compare and more clearly understand the structures of 
various elliptic curves  we define the notion of isomorphism for elliptic curves as 
follows. Two elliptic curves are isomorphic if they are isomorphic as projective varieties. 
 Briefly, two projective varieties V1, V2 over K are isomorphic over K if there exist 
morphisms τ : V1 → V2 , ψ : V2 → V1 (τ, ψ defined over K), such that ψ ° τ, τ° ψ are the 
identity maps on V1, V2 respectively.  (For a definition of morphism of projective 
varieties see [12, p.16]).  The following theorem relates the notion of isomorphism of 
elliptic curves to the coefficients of the Weierstrass equations that define the curves.   
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Table 4.   
 
Multiplication Table for F8 ≅ Z2(u) ≅ Z2[x]/ (x3 + x + 1) 
 
 
 
  u          u+1          u2                   u2+1           u2+u        u2+u+1         1   
u   u2  u2+u       u+1             1         u2+u+1        u2+1     u 
u+1    u2+u  u2+1     u2+u+1          u2           1  u    u+1 
u2       u +1     u2+u+1    u2+ u       u           u2+1        1      u2 
u2+1    1     u2          u  u2+u+1        u+1        u2 + u      u2+1 
u2+u   u2+u+1   1       u2+1     u+1   u                u2     u2+u 
u2+u+1  u2+1    u          1    u2+ u    u2         u+1    u2+u+1 
1     u   u+1          u2    u2+ 1           u2+u       u2+u+1       1 
 
 
 
Multiplication Table for F8 ≅ Z2(v) ≅ Z2[x]/ (x3 + x2 + 1) 
 
 
 
   v          v+1          v2                   v2+1           v2+v        v2+v+1         1    
v   v2  v2+v       v2+1       v2+v+1 1         v+1       v 
v+1    v2+v  v2+1          1      v       v2+v+1  v2     v+1 
v2       v2+1     1     v2+v+1    v+1  v         v2+v       v2 
v2+1   v2+v+1    v        v+1  v2+v  v2  1     v2+1 
v2+v     1 v2+v+1       v      v2          v+1         v2+1     v2+v 
v2+v+1  v+1    v2       v2+v      1          v2+1         v   v2+v+1 
1            v   v +1          v2   v2+1          v2+v       v2+v+1       1 
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Table 5.  Addition Table for Elements in the  
Elliptic Curve Group of y2 + y = x3 + x + 1 over F8 
 
 
 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7  
P1:(u,1)   P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
P2:(u2+u+1,u2+u+1) P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 
P3:(u2+u,1)   P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
P4:(u2,0)   P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
P5:(u+1,u+1)  P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
P6:(u2+1,u2+1)  P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 O 
P7:(u2+1,u2)  P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 O P1 
P8:(u+1,u)   P9 P10 P11 P12 O P1 P2 
P9:(u2,1)   P10 P11 P12 O P1 P2 P3 
P10:(u2+u,0) P11 P12 O P1 P2 P3 P4 
P11:(u2+u+1,u2+u) P12 O P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
P12:(u,0)   O P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
P13:O  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
 
 
P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13   
P1:(u,1)   P9 P10 P11 P12 O P1  
P2:(u2+u+1,u2+u+1) P10 P11 P12 O P1 P2  
P3:(u2+u,1)   P11 P12 O P1 P2 P3  
P4:(u2,0)   P12 O P1 P2 P3 P4  
P5:(u+1,u+1)  O P1 P2 P3 P4 P5  
P6:(u2+1,u2+1)  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6  
P7:(u2+1,u2)  P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7  
P8:(u+1,u)   P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8  
P9:(u2,1)   P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9  
P10:(u2+u,0) P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10  
P11:(u2+u+1,u2+u) P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11  
P12:(u,0)   P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12  
P13:O  P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 O  
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Theorem(see [9]). Two elliptic curves E1(K) and E2(K) given by 
E1(K): y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6 
E2(K): y2 + A1xy + A3 y = x3 + A2 x2 + A4 x + A6 
are isomorphic over K, written (E1(K)≅ E2(K)) if and only if there exists u,r,s, t ∈ K, u≠ 
0, such that the change of variables  
ψ: (x,y) → (u2x + r,u3y + u2sx + t) 
transforms equation E1 into equation E2. The relationship of isomorphism is an 
equivalence relation.  
The change of variables ψ is referred to as an admissible change of variables.  
Note that if  E1(K)≅ E2(K) and if ψ transforms E1 into E2, then the change of variables 
τ: (x, y) → (u-2 (x - r), u-3 (y - sx - t + rs)) 
transforms equation E2 into equation E1 and is also and admissible change of variables.  
Also,  
ψ maps E2 onto E1 while τ maps E 1 onto E 2.  Moreover,  ψ ° τ is the identity map on E 1, 
while τ° ψ is the identity map on E2.  It should be clear that ψ maps O such that O(E 1) =  
O(E 2).  
 
If E1(K)≅ E2(K), then the change of variables transforming E1 to E2 given by ψ 
yields the following set of equations: 
uA1  = a1 + 2s 
u2A2  = a2 - sa1 + 3r - s2 
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(*) u3A3 = a3 + ra1+ 2t 
u4A4 = a4 - sa3 +2ra2 - (t + rs)a1 + 3r2 - 2st 
u5A5 = a6 + ra4 + r2a2 + r3 - ta3 - t2 - rta1. 
The following is a restatement of the above theorem. 
Theorem. Two elliptic curves E1(K) and E2(K) are isomorphic over K if and only 
if there exists u, r, s, t ∈ K, u ≠ 0 satisfying the above relations (*). 
 
It is worth mentioning that there is a nice theorem giving the isomorphism classes 
for curves of a general form with j-invariant 0, the supersingular curves, defined over any 
extension of F2.  An isomorphism class, then, is just the collection of elliptic curves up to 
isomorphism over a given field. 
 
Theorem(see[9]). There are 3 isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over F2m 
with j-invariant equal to 0, where m is odd.  
 A representative from each class is given by  
y2 + y = x3 
y2 + y = x3 + x 
y2 + y = x3 + x + 1 
A CHARACTERISTIC 2 NON-SUPERSINGULAR CURVE: y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + 1 OVER F8   
The second of the two examples is a bit more interesting in its structure.  Using 
the model F8 ≅ Z2[x]/(x3 + x2 + 1), we compute points checking which elements from the 
appropriate table (see Table T4) satisfy this curve equation as before.  Note that checking 
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to see which pairs of the elements in F8* are valid is a bit more tedious, since there is an 
xy term on the left-hand side, so that new y values have to be computed for each x value 
and checked for equality.  After collecting all possible solutions for the curve equation 
we employ the addition formulas given below. The appropriate formulas [9] for this 
curve are given below. 
 
Addition of Distinct Points  
P1 = ( x1 , y1 ) and P2 = ( x2 , y2 ),  P1 + P2 ≠ O: 
x3 = ( y1 + y2 )2 (( x1 + x2 )2 )-1 + ( y1 + y2 )( x1 + x2 )-1 + x1 + x2 + 1 and  
y3 = ( y1 + y2 ) ( x1 + x2 )-1 ( x1 + x3 ) + x3 + y1. 
 
Doubling Formula for a Point P1 = ( x1 , y1 ), 2P1 ≠ O:   
x3 = x12 + (x12)-1   y3 = x3x1 + (x3y1)x1-1 + x12 + x3 
 
Note that if x1 = 0, we have immediately that (x3,y3) is taken to the identity, O. 
 
Observing the results of addition and doubling the pairs of solutions to the equation given 
above, we see that this curve contains 14 points in the group(see Table T6). 
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Table 6. Addition Table for Elements in the 
 Elliptic Curve Group of y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + 1 over F8 
 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
P1:(v+1,v2)   P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
P2:(v,v)   P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 
P3:(v2+1,v)   P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
P4:(v2+v+1,v2+v+1) P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
P5:(v2+v,v2)  P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
P6:(v2,0)   P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 
P7:(0,1)   P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 O 
P8:(v2,v2)   P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 O P1 
P9:(v2+v,v)   P10 P11 P12 P13 O P1 P2 
P10:(v2+v+1,0)  P11 P12 P13 O P1 P2 P3 
P11:(v2+1,v2+v+1) P12 P13 O P1 P2 P3 P4 
P12:(v,0)   P13 O P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
P13:(v+1,v2+v +1) O P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
P14:O  P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
 
 
P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 O 
P1:(v+1,v2)   P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 O P1 
P2:(v,v)   P10 P11 P12 P13 O P1 P2 
P3:(v2+1,v)   P11 P12 P13 O P1 P2 P3 
P4:(v2+v+1,v2+v+1) P12 P13 O P1 P2 P3 P4 
P5:(v2+v,v2)  P13 O P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
P6:(v2,0)   O P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
P7:(0,1)   P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 
P8:(v2,v2)   P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
P9:(v2+v,v)   P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 
P10:(v2+v+1,0)  P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
P11:(v2+1,v2+v+1) P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
P12:(v,0)   P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 
P13:(v+1,v2+v +1) P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12    P13 
P14:O  P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 O 
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Since the only abelian groups of order 14 are cyclic, we see that this curve group 
is isomorphic to Z14.  Further, by the table we see that P1 is a generator for the group.  
We close this section with a remark about the isomorphism classes for this curve. 
There is a theorem that enumerates all possible isomorphism classes for a  non-
supersingular characteristic 2 curve.  The following is given to clarify the meaning of 
Tr(γ), the trace of γ in the theorem.   
Multiplication by γ in F2m is a linear transformation in F2m . A linear transformation 
can be represented by a matrix so Tr(γ) is simply the trace of this matrix. 
Theorem([9, p.143]). There are 2(q-1) isomorphism classes of elliptic curves 
with j-invariant j(E) ≠ 0 over F2m where q = 2m . Let γ be an element of   F2m satisfying 
Tr(γ) = 1 (for m odd, we can take γ = 1).  A set of representatives of the isomorphism 
classes is given by 
  { y2 + xy = x3 + a 2x2 + a6  |  a 6 ∈ (F2m)*, a 2 ∈ { 0,  γ} }. 
A complete tabulation of these isomorphism classes is included in Table T7. 
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Table 7. Isomorphism Classes of Curves  
with Non-zero j-invariant over F8 
 
 
 
a2 = 0     a2 = 1 
 
 
y2 + xy = x3 + 1    y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + 1 
y2 + xy = x3 + α    y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + α 
y2 + xy = x3 + α + 1   y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + α + 1 
y2 + xy = x3 + α2    y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + α2 
y2 + xy = x3 + α2 + 1   y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + α2 + 1 
y2 + xy = x3 + α2 + α   y2 + xy = x3 + x2 +  α2 + α 
y2 + xy = x3 + α2 + α + 1   y2 + xy = x3 + x2 + α2 + α + 1 
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AN ELLIPTIC CURVE OVER F27: y2 = x3 + 2x2 + 1 
 
A final example of elliptic curves, y2 = x3 + 2x2 + 1 defined over F27, completes 
the survey. Once again, a multiplication table was tabulated (see Table T8) for use in 
finding points of the curve group and adding and doubling formulas obtained.  
Addition (P1 + P2 ≠ O):   
λ = (y2 - y1)/(x2 - x1)-1   x3 = λ2 - 2 - x1 - x2 
Doubling (2P1 ≠ O): 
λ = x ( 2y )-1    x3 = λ2 - 2 - 2x1 
Again, if  y = 0, then doubling P=(x,y) immediately obtains the identity and for both 
cases the new y coordinate is given by  
y3  =  -y1 + λ(x1 - x3). 
 After computing by substituting the field elements and 0 in the curve equation, 
we find that we have precisely 20 points for the group (Table T9). Thus, the Hasse 
estimate shows that  the bounds |q + 1 - n | ≤ 2√ q are satisfied where q = 33  and  
q + 1 - 2√ q ≈ 17.60 ≤ 20  ≤  q + 1  + 2√ q ≈ 38.39. 
Table T10 gives the group table.  Some consideration and a few computations should 
suffice to convince the reader that the group has structure isomorphic to Z2 X Z2 X Z5. 
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Table 8.  Field Elements of F27\{0} 
 F27 ≅ Z3[x]/(x3 + 2x2 + 1) ≅ Z3(α) 
 
j       αj 
 
0     1 
1     α 
2     α2 
3     α2 + 2 
4     α2 + 2α + 2 
5     2α + 2 
6     2α2 + 2α 
7     α2 + 1 
8     α2 + α + 2 
9     2α2 + 2α + 2 
           10     α2 + 2α + 1 
       11     α + 2 
12     α2 + 2α 
13     2 
14     2α 
15     2α2 
16     2α2 + 1 
17     2α2 + α + 1 
18     α + 1 
19     α2 + α 
20     2α2 + 2 
21     2α2 + 2α + 1 
22     α2 + α + 1 
23     2α2 + α + 2 
24     2α + 1 
25     2α2 + α   
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Table 9. Points of the Curve E: y2 = x3 + 2x2 + 1 over F27 
 
A1 (α2 + α + 2, α + 1)  A3 (α2 + 1, 2α2 + α + 2) 
A2 (α2 + 1, α2 + 2α + 1)  A4 (α2 + α + 2, 2α + 2)  
B1 (2α + 1, α2)   B2 (2α2 + 2α + 1, α2 + 2α + 2) 
B3 (2α2 + 2α + 1, 2α2 + α + 1) B4 (2α + 1, 2α2) 
C1 (2α2 + 2, 2α2 + 2α)  C2 (α + 2, α2 + 2α) 
C3 (α + 2, 2α2 + α)  C4 (2α2 + 2, α2 + α) 
D1 (1,1)    D2 (0,1)  
D3 (0,2)    D4 (1,2)    
O1 (α , 0)    O2  (α2 + 2, 0) 
O3 (2α2 + 2α + 2, 0)  O    
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Table 10. Group Table for Elements of E: y2 = x3 + 2x2  + 1 
 
 
A1 B1 C1 D1 A2 B2 C2 D2 A3 B3 C3 D3 A4 B4 C4 D4 O1 O2 O3 O4 
                                                                                                                                        
                      
A1 D2 B2 A2 C2 B3 A3 D3 C3 C4 B4 D4 A4 O4 O3 O2 O1 D1 C1 B1 A1  
B1 B2 D2 C2 A2 D3 C3 B3 A3 D4 A4 C4 B4 O3 O4 O1 O2 C1 D1 A1 B1 
C1 A2 C2 D2 B2 C3 D3 A3 B3 A4 D4 B4 C4 O2 O1 O4 O3 B1 A1 D1 C1 
D1 C2 A2 B2 D2 A3 B3 C3 D3 B4 C4 A4 D4 O1 O2 O3 O4 A1 B1 C1 D1 
A2 B3 D3 C3 A3 D4 A4 C4 B4 O4 O1 O3 O2 C1 D1 A1 B1 B2 D2 C2 A2  
B2 A3 C3 D3 B3 A4 D4 B4 C4 O1 O4 O2 O3 B1 A1 D1 C1 A2 C2 D2 B2 
C2 D3 B3 A3 C3 C4 B4 D4 A4 O3 O2 O4 O1 D1 C1 B1 A1 D2 B2 A2 C2 
D2 C3 A3 B3 D3 B4 C4 A4 D4 O2 O3 O1 O4 A1 B1 C1 D1 C2 A2 B2 D2 
A3 C4 D4 A4 B4 O4 O1 O3 O2 D1 A1 C1 B1 B2 D2 C2 A2 B3 D3 C3 A3 
B3 B4 A4 D4 C4 O1 O4 O2 O3 A1 D1 B1 C1 A2 C2 D2 B2 A3 C3 D3 B3 
C3 D4 C4 B4 A4 O3 O2 O4 O1 C1 B1 D1 A1 D2 B2 A2 C2 D3 B3 A3 C3 
D3 A4 B4 C4 D4 O2 O3 O1 O4 B1 C1 A1 B1 C2 A2 B2 D2 C3 A3 B3 D3 
A4 O4 O3 O2 O1 C1 B1 D1 A1 B2 A2 D2 C2 D3 B3 A3 C3 D4 C4 B4 A4 
B4 O3 O4 O1 O2 D1 A1 C1 B1 D2 C2 B2 A2 B3 D3 C3 A3 C4 D4 A4 B4 
C4 O2 O1 O4 O3 A1 D1 B1 C1 C2 D2 A2 B2 A3 C3 D3 B3 B4 A4 D4 C4 
D4 O1 O2 O3 O4 B1 C1 A1 D1 A2 B2 C2 D2 C3 A3 B3 D3 A4 B4 C4 D4 
O1 D1 C1 B1 A1 B2 A2 D2 C2 B3 A3 D3 C3 D4 C4 B4 A4 O4 O3 O2 O1 
O2 C1 D1 A1 B1 D2 C2 B2 A2 D3 C3 B3 A3 C4 D4 A4 B4 O3 O4 O1 O2 
O3 B1 A1 D1 C1 C2 D2 A2 B2 C3 D3 A3 B3 B4 A4 D4 C4 O2 O1 O4 O3  
O4 A1 B1 C1 D1 A2 B2 C2 D2 A3 B3 C3 D3 A4 B4 C4 D4 O1 O2 O3 O4 
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CLASSIFICATION OF ELLIPTIC CURVES OVER F3 UP TO ISOMORPHISM 
 
One final area of interest regarding the elliptic curves of characteristic 3 would be 
to assess the actual number and structure of all the elliptic curves up to isomorphism for 
both supersingular and non-supersingular curves. In the case where these curves are 
defined over F3, we examine the supersingular case (j-invariant 0) and then the non-
supersingular and present a complete tabulation below. 
Checking first through the list of curves(see Table T1), and making the 
substitution x → x + 1 and y → y gives   
C1 ≅ C2 ≅ C3 .  
 In fact, all 3 of these curves have isomorphic curve groups, each being isomorphic  to 
Z4.  On the other hand, C4, C5 and C 6  each have distinct structures as can be seen from 
the tabulation. 
Characteristic 3 curves with j(C) = 0 
Curve Group 
Isomorphic to Z4      Distinct Curves   Curve Groups 
 
C1:y2 = x3 + x       C4: y2 = x3 + 2x    ≅ Z2 X Z2 
C2:y2 = x3 + x + 1      C5: y2 = x3 + 2x + 1  ≅ Z7 
C3: y2 = x3 + x + 2      C6: y2 = x3 + 2x + 2  ≅ {O}(trivial ) 
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Thus we have a 
Proposition.  There are exactly 4 elliptic curves defined over F3 up to 
isomorphism with j-invariant j(E) = 0 and these are represented by C1, C4, C5 and C6.  
 
A table of nonsupersingular curves with their respective j-invariants follows. 
 
E1: y2 = x3 + x2 + 1    j(E1) = 2 
E2: y2 = x3 + x2 + 2    j(E2) = 1 
E3: y2 = x3 + 2x2 + 1    j(E3) = 1 
E4: y2 = x3 + 2x2 + 2    j(E4) = 2 
 
A computation shows that the remaining curves each have distinct group structures as 
shown below. 
Curve Group        Curve Group 
E1: y2 = x3 + x2 + 1 ≅ Z6    E3: y2 = x3 + 2x2 + 1 ≅ Z5 
E2: y2 = x3 + x2 + 2 ≅ Z3    E4: y2 = x3 + 2x2 + 2 ≅ Z2 
 
Proposition.  There are 4 isomorphism classes of elliptic curves defined over F3 
with non-zero j-invariant and they are represented by the curves E1, E2, E3 and E4.  
(Notice that j(E2) = j(E 3) and j(E 1) = j(E  4) but the curves E 1,  E  2,  E 3 and  E 4 are all in 
distinct isomorphism classes.) 
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THE IMPLEMENTATION 
IMBEDDING 
In this final section we will discuss some imbedding algorithms, the encryption 
algorithm used in this implementation and a few remarks pertaining to the computational 
work involved. 
   We begin by imbedding plaintexts as points on some elliptic curve E defined 
over a finite field Fp.  We want to do this systematically so that we can retrieve a 
response plaintext from the knowledge of the coordinates of the corresponding embedded 
point.  Let the plaintext be denoted by m and the corresponding point Pm. 
There is no polynomial time deterministic algorithm known by which we can 
write down a large number of points on E over our field but probabilistic ones do exist 
[5].  Also, in order to encode a large number of possible messages m, we need some 
systematic way to generate points that are related to m in some way.  We might use, for 
example, the x coordinate of Pm. 
To begin, let us consider elements of a prime field, Fp, such that p ≡ 3 mod 4 and 
let y2 = f(x) be an elliptic curve over Fp. Next, we pick our plaintexts to be integers m in 
the range 0≤ m ≤ (p/1000) - 1.  We go about imbedding by trying to append three digits 
to each m in turn, until we obtain an x, 1000m ≤ x ≤ 1000(m + 1) < p, such that f(x) is a 
quadratic residue in Fp.   When a y is found such that y2 = f(x), we set up a 1-1 
correspondence between the point found and some plaintext unit letting Pm = (x,y).  Since 
f(x) is square for approximately half of all x, there is only about a 2-1000 probability that 
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the method will fail to produce a point Pm = (x,f(x)) satisfying the above criteria. 
 
COMPUTATION OF SQUARE ROOTS IN THE FIELD   
Some programming instructions were applied to generate a few large primes of 
approximately 40 digits and also to test the prime p for congruence to 3 modulo 4. Since 
αp-1 = 1 in the multiplicative group Fp *,  α p = α and α(p+1) = α2.   Therefore, when f(x) is a 
square in Fp, then (x, f(x) (p+1)/4) is a point on the curve and hence suitable for 
representing some plaintext message unit. Working in a larger field for this 
implementation presented a computational challenge to compute the points. The 
exponentiation to find the f(x) (p+1)/4 required a combination of modular reduction and a 
special algorithm to permit rapid computation. 
 
ENCRYPTION AND DECRYPTION 
We now come to the encryption portion of the algorithm.  This particular 
implementation will use the method of ElGamal cryptosystems for transmitting 
messages[3]. Two variations of the method and aspects of point computations are briefly 
discussed. For a general flow diagram of the imbedding/encryption algorithm see Fig F2. 
  Begin by fixing a finite field Fp , an elliptic curve E defined over it and a base 
point B ∈ E.  These must be known to any user (transmitter or receiver) but one does not 
need to know the number N of points of E in this method.  A receiver  chooses a secret 
random integer a, and computes and publishes his key, aB.  To send a message Pm, 
choose a random integer k and send the pair of points (kB,P m + k(aB)) corresponding to 
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the encrypted plaintext and the multiplied base point for each message unit. To read the 
message, the receiver  multiplies the first point in the pair by his own secret a and 
subtracts the result from the second point.  Thus, 
Pm + k(aB) - a(kB) = Pm.   
More specifically, the pair of points a user would send to a receiver are given as follows. 
Let B = (xB,yB), Pm = (xPm,yPm) .  Then the user sends the pair of points 
{(xkB,ykB), ((xPm,yPm) + (xkaB, ykaB))} 
where (xkB,ykB) and (x kaB, y  kaB) are multiples k and ka of the point (x   B , y  B).  Then the 
decryption of the message is performed by simply taking the additive inverse of the point 
(xakB,yakB) and by using an appropriate addition formula for the curve in use, adding this 
to the point ((xPm,yPm) + (x kaB, y kaB)) to obtain the plaintext message point. Thus we 
have (xPm,yPm) + (xkaB, ykaB) - (xakB,yakB) =  (xPm,yPm). 
In this implementation the value of k was not fixed throughout encryption.  One may let 
k vary since only the knowledge of the base point B and the curve equation is needed by 
a receiver to decrypt a message. The receivers knowledge of their key is sufficient for 
decryption. 
 
 
Figure 2. Flow Diagram for  
Imbedding/Encryption  
(See file flowii.sam) 
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Figure 3.  Flow Diagram for Decryption 
(see file flowiii.sam) 
 
 
Two ways of choosing a curve and a base point are mentioned here.  First, one 
can simply choose a random curve E over a large field Fq not of characteristic 2, i.e., 
where E has an equation of the form y2 = x3 + ax2 + bx + c and a base point B = (x,y) on 
E. How this is done is illustrated using the following particular example.  Given the 
equation  
y2 =  x3 + bx + c 
we can choose random elements x, y and b from Fq, q = pn.  Then, any c satisfying 
c = y2 - (x3 + bx)  
gives the appropriate curve with a point on it.  In the case of a characteristic 2 curve,  
g(y) = y2 is replaced by y2 + y.  Since the discriminant ∆ satisfies the requirement that 
 ∆≠ 0 (since ∆ = 1), this curve is an elliptic curve, and we may set B = (x,y).   
A second method involves choosing a “global” elliptic curve E defined over the 
rationals, or more generally, a number field. Then pick B to be a point of infinite order on 
E.  Next, choose a large prime p ( or a prime ideal of the ring of integers of K if our curve 
is defined over an extension field K of Q) and consider the reduction of E and B mod p.  
That is, for all p not dividing the discriminant  ∆E of E and such that the coefficients in 
the equation for E have no p in their denominators, we may consider the coefficients in 
this equation mod p.  
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In both of these methods one wishes to choose the point B such that B generates a 
large subgroup.  To do so, one should know beforehand whether B is a point of infinite 
order in the same curve defined over the rationals.  For if this is the case, then it is likely 
that B will generate a large subgroup [5].  The question then comes down to knowing if B 
has infinite order in the same curve defined over the rationals.  One can use the following 
two theorems to determine the answer. These are given without proof here[13].  
Theorem(Nagell-Lutz). Let E be a non-singular cubic curve defined by  
E: y2  = x3 + ax2 + bx + c with integer coefficients a, b, c, and let D be the discriminant 
given by D = -4a3c +a2b2 + 18abc - 4b 3 - 27c 2.  Then a rational point of finite order must 
have integer coordinates and either y = 0 or y divides D.  
(A stronger form of the Nagell-Lutz Theorem handy for computational purposes states: 
Let P = (x,y) be a rational point of finite order with y≠ 0.  Then y2  D.) 
Reduction Modulo p Theorem.  Let E be as defined above with discriminant D 
as given above.  Let Φ⊆ E(Q) be the subgroup consisting of all points of finite order.  For 
any prime p, let P  P′ be the reduction modulo p map where Φ  E′(Fp),    
P  P′ = (x′, y′) if P = (x,y),  
O′ if P = O (identity element).   
If p does not divide 2D, then the reduction modulo p map is an isomorphism of Φ onto a 
subgroup of E′(Fp).   
Now for any curve, and in particular the given curve y2 = x 3 + x + 1 of this 
implementation, we may apply the theorems as follows.   We notice that the discriminant 
D = -31.  First, by the Nagell-Lutz Theorem, any rational point of finite order must have 
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integer coordinates.  At this point, we would like to apply these theorems to (0,1) and 
(72,611) observing that (72,611) is a point of infinite order.  Next, we can use the 
reduction theorem and determine the order of Φ as follows.  We first check #E(Fp) for 
several  primes p > 2D (here 2D = 2(-31) to obtain the following list of the orders of each 
curve group. For example, #E(F67) = 56 and #E(F71) = 59.  Now since Φ ⊆ E(Fp) for p_ 
2D, then #Φ must divide #E(Fp) since by the reduction theorem the map Φ  E′(Fp) is an 
isomorphism of Φ onto a subgroup of E(Fp).  But for the groups listed above, it is clear 
that if #Φ #E(Fp) then #Φ must equal 1 since (56,59) = 1.  Hence, the only point of 
finite order of E(Q) is O, the identity itself.   It follows that the points (0,1) and (72,611) 
are both good candidates for a base point B in the encryption algorithm since they will 
probably generate large subgroups. 
 
THE SECURITY OF ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEMS 
Breaking a cryptosystem of the El-Gamal type requires solution of the elliptic 
curve analog of the discrete log problem which is stated thus: 
 
 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem: Given an elliptic curve E defined over Fq 
 and points P, Q ∈ E, find x ∈ Z such that Q = xP, if such x exists. 
 
It is believed that this problem will prove to be more intractable than the classical 
discrete  log problem and thus far, the strongest techniques known do not seem applicable 
to the present encryption methods using elliptic curves [5]. 
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 THE ORDER OF THE CURVE GROUP    
At this point, the question arises, how large a field should one choose?  Clearly, 
even in a relatively small prime field, there would be enough points available in the curve 
group for imbedding, so considerations for those aspects are not primary. What is 
important concerns the issue of security.  For the purposes of this implementation, a 
prime field of 383 + 356 elements was chosen.  This 39 digit integer, is close to the lower 
bound for a secure curve which has been shown to be a 40 digit integer [6].  One should 
seek a curve to be defined over a large enough field, such that the subgroups of the curve 
group have  large or  small indices.  Such a choice ensures security since it is known that 
such curves (for example, nonsupersingular) are not vulnerable to certain types of attack 
such as those utilizing index calculus methods [11].  
We cannot directly determine the curve’s order or structure since  simply 
counting points works fine only for curves of considerably smaller order. The reason is 
that the method necessary to find the order of the curve group for this implementation 
would require excessive computational  capabilities [6].  Now it is known that we have 
good security for a curve whose order is at least as large as a 40 digit prime when dealing 
with supersingular curves[6, p.157]. The same criterion was applied though this curve 
has non-zero j-invariant, hence is not supersingular.   
 
COMPUTATIONS OF POINTS IN THE CURVE GROUP 
To add and double points, separate algorithms were developed based on the point 
computation formulas as used over F5.  The doubling algorithm takes the following 
approach.  One takes the number which will serve as the multiplier of a point P for some 
 
 
46
multiple nP of P.  Then n is expanded in binary code.  For any n we can write n in binary 
            K 
representation where n =  Σ aj2j ,  aj ∈{0,1}.  For each binary evaluation where 1 is a  
j=0   
value in the j-th binary digit, take 2j and sum for each nonzero value in the binary 
representation.  The result is a sum of various powers of 2 that adds up to n.   For small n 
this is hardly worth mentioning.  But say one wishes to take large multiples say of the 
order of 10100, then there is clearly no substitute for this approach.  For example, to raise 
a value say a1000 only 15 total operations are needed to get the solution via multiplications 
and additions versus 1000 by brute exponentiation.  
 
A CLOSING REMARK 
The output generated in this implementation includes a list of alphanumeric 
characters typically useful in everyday written communication.  This list consists of a 
plaintext unit, i.e., the alphanumeric character and an assigned coordinate pair whose 
coordinates are those of a point on the curve.  Since the imbedding algorithm calls for 
each range of x values to be computed in multiples of 1000, incremented one at a time 
the programming instructions were entered to reduce these computations but still obtain 
some points for each character.  Thus the program is made to increment through a value 
of 100 at a time between each multiple of 1000 to save time and output.   Also, note that 
in each case, the only digits we are concerned with are the initial three digits of the first 
coordinate in the pair.  This is because, when encrypting, each plaintext is actually 
associated to those digits.   
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The program output for the encryption of the word “math” is also included.   
First, a list of points of the curve in which the plaintext characters are imbedded is 
generated.  Next, an odd multiple of the base point B is obtained.  The program then 
takes the message character by character and picks out the corresponding point in the 
character imbedding list. The program then multiplies the public key point labeled aB an 
odd number  times and adds the result to the point representing the imbedded character. 
Finally, the pair of points representing the multiplied base point and the encrypted 
plaintext are sent . 
The program code for this implementation reveals that when one has reached a 
multiple of the identity, further computations breakdown.  Indeed, Silverman and Tate 
use this fact to aid in their prime factorization scheme adopted from Lenstra[13].  We can 
use this event to indicate that we have computed the order for some subgroup. We can 
with a little luck obtain several such orders.  
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APPENDIX  
 
PROGRAMS 
 
 
BeginPackage["CongruentPrime"] 
 
c:=(3^83)-2; 
 
Print["These are the primes from 3^83-2 to "]; 
Print["3^83+400 that are Congruent to 3 Mod 4"]; 
 
For[t=0,t<402,t++; 
If[PrimeQ[c+t]&&TrueQ[Mod[c+t-3,4]==0], 
Print["3^83+",t-2," is ",c+t]]]; 
Unprotect[In,Out]; 
Clear[In,Out]; 
End[] 
 
These are the primes from 3^83-2 to  
3^83+400 that are Congruent to 3 Mod 4 
 
3^83+236 is 3990838394187339929534246675572349035463 
3^83+356 is 3990838394187339929534246675572349035583 
 
 
(This package was used to verify that Fp was indeed a finite field 
of prime order where p = 383 + 356 elements.) 
 
Dupl[x_,y_]:= (   (*This duplicates points for y^2=x^3+x+1*) 
 
p=(3^83)+356; 
 
Newx = Mod[Mod[PowerMod[x,4,p]-2PowerMod[x,2,p]-8x+1,p]* 
PowerMod[Mod[4PowerMod[x,3,p]+4x+4,p],-1,p],p];  
Lambda =  Mod[Mod[3PowerMod[x,2,p]+1,p]* 
PowerMod[Mod[2y,p],-1,p],p]; 
Nu =  Mod[Mod[PowerMod[-x,3,p]+x+2,p]*PowerMod[2y,-1,p],p]; 
Newpty = Mod[-Lambda*Newx -Nu,p]; ) 
 
 
Addpts[x1_,y1_,x2_,y2_]:= (  (*This program adds points of   *) 
(*the curve group y^2=x^3+x+1*) 
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p=(3^83)+356; 
 
Lambda = Mod[(y2-y1)*PowerMod[(x2-x1),-1,p],p]; 
Nu = Mod[(Mod[y1*x2,p]-Mod[x1*y2,p])* 
PowerMod[x2-x1,-1,p],p]; 
Nextptx = Mod[PowerMod[Lambda,2,p]-x1-x2,p]; 
Nexty= Mod[-Lambda*Nextptx-Nu,p]; 
 
PmKab1=Nextptx; 
PmKab2=Nexty; 
 
If[x1==x2&&y1==y2, 
Do[Dupl[x1,y1]; 
Nextptx=Newx; 
Nexty=Newpty; 
]]; 
 
If[x1==x2&&y1!=y2, 
Do[Print["Identity has been reached,  
further computations may fail"]; 
Break]; 
] ) 
 
Oddmult[n_,x_,y_]:= (  
  
(* This program finds new points on a curve E       *) 
(* using the duplication and addition routines         *) 
(* for a multiple nP of some point P on E where     *) 
(* n is odd.                                    *) 
 
(* It should be noted that for n generating a point *) 
(* value of one greater than the identity, i.e.,         *) 
(* O + 1, a point value may not be computed.       *) 
 
i=0;a=x;b=y;j=0;m=n;h=0;ssu=0; 
 
p=(3^83)+356; 
 
While[Floor[m] > 0, 
j=Mod[m,2]; 
m=Floor[m/2]; 
Dupl[x,y];       
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If[j!=0,    
For[h=1,h<i,h++; 
Dupl[Newx,Newpty]]; 
ssu=ssu+2^i;     
 
If[h==i&&i>=1, 
Do[Addpts[a,b,Newx,Newpty]; 
 
If[x==Nextptx&&y==Nexty&&OddQ[n]==True, 
Print[ssu-1, " is a multiple of Order of Subgroup"]]; 
 
If[x==Nextptx&&y==Nexty&&EvenQ[n]==True, 
Print[ssu," is a multiple of Order of Subgroup"]]; 
a=Nextptx; 
b=Nexty]; 
]]; 
Newx=0; 
Newpty=0; 
i=i+1]; 
Kmult1=Nextptx; 
Kmult2=Nexty; ) 
 
Binary[n_,x_,y_]:= (  
  
(* This program finds new points on a curve E  *) 
(* using the duplication and addition routines *) 
(* for a multiple nP of some point P on E  *) 
(* where n is 2 raised to any power.         *) 
 
(* It should be noted that for n generating a  *) 
(* point value of one greater than the identity, *) 
(* i.e.,O + 1,a point value may not be computed. *) 
 
i=0;a=0;b=0;j=0;m=n;h=0;ct=0;chk=0; 
 
p=(3^83)+356; 
 
While[Floor[m] > 0, 
 
Newx=x; 
Newpty=y; 
j=Mod[m,2]; 
m=Floor[m/2]; 
 
 
52
i=i+1;     
If[j!=0,    
For[h=1,h<i,h++; 
Dupl[Newx,Newpty]]; 
ct=ct+1; 
If[ct==1, 
Do[a=Newx; 
b=Newpty]]; 
If[ct==2, 
Do[Addpts[a,b,Newx,Newpty]; 
ct=0; 
chk=chk+1; 
a=0; 
b=0]]; 
If[chk==0&&ct==1, 
key1=Newx; 
key2=Nexpty;   
]]] ) 
 
SuprFast[x_,n_]:=( 
   
(*This is the modular exponentiation*) 
(*routine used to compute the square*) 
(*root of a point on a curve.     *) 
 
v=1;t=x;u=n;p=(3^83)+356; 
 
While[u!=0, 
If[OddQ[u],v=Mod[t*v,p]]; 
t=Mod[t*t,p]; 
u=Floor[u/2]] ) 
 
f[x_]:=Mod[(PowerMod[x,3,p]+Mod[x,p]+1),p];  
 
chr[m_]:=FromCharacterCode[m]; 
 
 
(*This program segment obtains a list of  *) 
(*characters and their corresponding curve*) 
(*points to be used in encryption.   *) 
 
For[m=95,m<126,m++; 
scrib=0; 
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For[i=(1000m)-1,i<(1000(m+1))-1,i+=100; 
 
If[JacobiSymbol[f[i],p]==1&&Less[scrib,1], 
 
SuprFast[f[i],(p+1)/4]; 
FirstNum[i]=i; 
SecNum[i]=v; 
 
Print[chr[m]," ","(",FirstNum[i],",",SecNum[i],")"]; 
scrib=scrib+1; 
]]] 
 
 
 
` (96199,638980037437888504045701428611399734783) 
a (97099,407400891462210333150853674387688784652) 
b (98099,1183512579460980263085960569438504931187) 
c (99299,1845537342405968058653005330058291591346) 
d (100199,885324002290167212251211050939945624588) 
e (101099,132700281707667399073464236777835492473) 
f (102099,3742113120867548216510054180811595439545) 
g (103499,388432628486131332886099804254378476958) 
h (104099,353170475930308384648202162360896173520) 
i (105099,3168184333516993997296042856190352511925) 
j (106199,3025236684521334585758113882831062869655) 
k (107199,98796042376014285886081461219382869141) 
l (108199,383130834865097488488621334576401261219) 
m (109199,3934820829704801630116070451435801664349) 
n (110199,3840372591736730901350634246188652819640) 
o (111199,1242914571737917737493365544851399135812) 
p (112099,689372942146882812497828847004335664504) 
q (113199,3109027603757293144338648065480016215496) 
r (114099,3535847087175373911814302697966882322638) 
s (115099,2299184535944242086339667580998578220257) 
t (116299,3266063780054608413745513507237682464899) 
u (117399,2283604676327804864911807583375038605791) 
v (118099,1656163260722712624963123918140864967034) 
w (119199,1490273550928298529290274023746874530766) 
x (120099,366419241186862377505012532708313221466) 
y (121099,1332787559491678113642211944499761412561) 
z (122199,2073795046384097820917895255023833658213) 
{ (123199,2635348364288049068951772678786870659878) 
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| (124199,2067608295478529181510583465469072522262) 
} (125599,444247223105912366581029562053245546066) 
~ (126499,3393543185812876309488882217936491300889) 
 
 
Finder[T_]:= ( 
 
(* Finder takes a short message  and obtains the corresponding  *) 
(* point in the imbedding list.   Next, it takes that point and  add*) 
(*an odd multiple of the key point aB.  It also finds the same od*) 
(* multiple of the base point B.  It then prints the pair (KB, Pm + KaB) *) 
(* which is ready for transmission.    K is based on the position of         *) 
(* the plaintext unit in the message.*) 
 
B1=0;B2=1;  (* Base Point B is fixed here. *) 
 
 
SuprFast[x,n];  (* Call to SuprFast to provide a list of characters *) 
      (* and the  associated points of the curve.             *)   
 
Binary[2,B1,B2];     (*This instruction provides the key aB*) 
aB1=key1; 
aB2=key2; 
(* Begin the Main Routine *) 
 
For[j=0,j<StringLength[T],j++;   (* This subroutine matches the*) 
For[m=95,m<126,m++;  (* character string entered in   *) 
(* Finder[“                           ”].*) 
 
If[TrueQ[{m}==ToCharacterCode[Part[Characters[T],j]]], 
For[i=(1000m)-1,i<1000(m+1)-1,i+=100; 
If[FirstNum[i]!=0,  
abscissa[j]=FirstNum[i]; 
ordinate[j]=SecNum[i];  
]]]]]; 
For[k=0,k<StringLength[T],k++; 
Oddmult[(2*k)+1,B1,B2]; 
KB1=Kmult1;KB2=Kmult2; 
 
Oddmult[(2*k)+1,aB1,aB2]; 
KaB1=Kmult1;KaB2=Kmult2; 
 
Addpts[abscissa[k],ordinate[k],KaB1,KaB2]; 
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Print["(",KB1,",",KB2,")","(",PmKab1,",",PmKab2,")"]; 
]  ) 
 
Note: The output below consists of a pair of points, namely 
1 pair of coordinates representing the point KB,  multiple K  
of a Base Point B on the curve and a second pair of co- 
ordinates for the point on the curve  representing the encrypted  
plaintext character.  The second pair is for the point Pm + Kab. 
Also, values of K are odd, K > 1 with K varying based on the 
value of the position of the character being read in the message. 
Finally, a is fixed(a = 2) and base point B = (0,1). 
 
Finder["math"]              Value Plaintext
                   of K  Character 
 
 
(72,611),                  3      
  
(2120182538273374613423909732074790088737,            m 
 2097335071274777843865762439195358882258) 
 
 
(3136797330506340513031676944844601989362,      5 
 3580352307916379721552840580651071863032) 
 
(1871029243194231406672470105479725471723,         a    
 2053606974067593281960906694888920564678) 
 
 
(2132937940095601196785101439261903771580,      7 
 3160407877275413282235520796170817399747) 
 
(728936147976064104144939706891487478589,         t    
 3785844195617269816849677347483472508077) 
 
 
(2719998170555649296149132055578342678326,      9 
 36394492944495833666724834986032737527) 
 
(3172095020457994897280937401319379987655,         h 
 1787604861424218667506483661868050188080) 
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